ABSTRACT
Platform businesses allow for collaboration with nontraditional partners and bring together different categories of customers, in the financial context savers and investors or lenders and borrowers, creating large, scalable networks of users. Their entry into finance promises potential benefits to consumers in the form of new products, lower prices, wider choice, and enhanced consumer experience. At the same time, their new business models and technologies potentially threaten the dominant position of traditional financial services providers and create challenges for regulators. Platform businesses can use their preferential access to customer data to skim off high-quality loans, leaving only low-quality customers for other lenders. Their ability to offer complementary nonfinancial services that cannot be supplied by FinTech start-ups and banks can make it difficult or unattractive for customers to switch to alternative providers. This danger is especially acute when BigTech firms have monopoly power in other markets that complement financial services.
ABSTRACT
It is sometimes said that an effect of the COVID-19 pandemic will be heightened appreciation of the importance of scientific research and expertise. We test this hypothesis by examining how exposure to previous epidemics affected trust in science and scientists. Building on the “impressionable years hypothesis” that attitudes are durably formed during the ages 18 to 25, we focus on individuals exposed to epidemics in their country of residence at this particular stage of the life course. Combining data from a 2018 Wellcome Trust survey of more than 75,000 individuals in 138 countries with data on global epidemics since 1970, we show that such exposure has no impact on views of science as an endeavor but that it significantly reduces trust in scientists and in the benefits of their work. We also illustrate that the decline in trust is driven by the individuals with little previous training in science subjects. Finally, our evidence suggests that epidemic-induced distrust translates into lower compliance with health-related policies in the form of negative views towards vaccines and lower rates of child vaccination.
ABSTRACT
What political legacy is bequeathed by national health crises such as epidemics? We show that epidemic exposure in an individual’s “impressionable years” (ages 18 to 25) has a persistent negative effect on confidence in political institutions and leaders. The effect is specific to the impressionable ages, observed only for political institutions and leaders, and does not carry over to other institutions and individuals with one key exception. That exception is strong negative effects on confidence in public health systems, suggesting that the loss of confidence in political institutions and leaders is associated with the (in)effectiveness of a government’s healthcare-related responses to past epidemics. We document this mechanism, showing that weak governments took longer to introduce policy interventions in response to the COVID-19 outbreak, and demonstrating that the loss of political trust is larger for individuals who experienced epidemics under weak governments. Finally, we report evidence suggesting that the epidemic-induced loss of political trust may discourage electoral participation in the long term.
ABSTRACT
We ask whether epidemic exposure leads to a shift in financial technology usage within and across countries and if so who participates in this shift. We exploit a dataset combining Gallup World Polls and Global Findex surveys for some 250,000 individuals in 140 countries, merging them with information on the incidence of epidemics and local 3G internet infrastructure. Epidemic exposure is associated with an increase in remote-access (online/mobile) banking and substitution from bank branch-based to ATM-based activity. Using a machine-learning algorithm, we show that heterogeneity in this response centers on the age, income and employment of respondents. Young, high-income earners in full-time employment have the greatest propensity to shift to online/mobile transactions in response to epidemics. These effects are larger for individuals in subnational regions with better ex ante 3G signal coverage, highlighting the role of the digital divide in adaption to new technologies necessitated by adverse external shocks.
ABSTRACT
In this paper we seek to make headway on the question of what recovery from Covid-19 recession may look like, focusing on the duration of the recovery - that is, how long it will take to re-attain the levels of output and employment reached at the prior business cycle peak. We start by categorizing all post-1960 recessions in advanced countries and emerging markets into supply-shock, demand-shock and both-shock induced recessions. We measure recovery duration as the number of years required to re-attain pre-recession levels of output or employment. We then rely on the earlier literature on business cycle dynamics to identify candidate variables that can help to account for variations in recovery duration following different kinds of shocks. By asking which of these variables are operative in the Covid-19 recession, we can then draw inferences about the duration of the recovery under different scenarios. A number of our statistical results point in the direction of lengthy recoveries.
ABSTRACT
The dollar fell by 10 per cent between its March 2020 high and the end of the calendar year, and many banks and forecasters expect it to fall further, by as much as 35 per cent in 2021. Dollar skeptics cite the end of safe-haven flows following the approval of CO VID vaccines, the Federal Reserve's aggressive quantitative easing, America's twin deficits, and the rise of viable alternatives to the greenback. This article argues, in contrast, that this dollar pessimism is overdrawn.
ABSTRACT
It is sometimes said that an effect of the COVID-19 pandemic will be heightened appreciation of the importance of scientific research and expertise. We test this hypothesis by examining how exposure to previous epidemics affected trust in science and scientists. Building on the "impressionable years hypothesis" that attitudes are durably formed during the ages 18-25, we focus on individuals exposed to epidemics in their country of residence at this particular stage of the life course. Combining data from a 2018 Wellcome Trust survey of more than 75,000 individuals in 138 countries with data on global epidemics since 1970, we show that such exposure has no impact on views of science as an endeavor but that it significantly reduces trust in scientists and in the benefits of their work. We also illustrate that the decline in trust is driven by the individuals with little previous training in science subjects. Finally, our evidence suggests that epidemic-induced distrust translates into lower compliance with health-related policies in the form of negative views towards vaccines and lower rates of child vaccination.
ABSTRACT
Political polarization, meaning sharp differences in the political ideologies and preferences of the partisans of different parties, implies that members of one party are more likely to dismiss the policies and recommendations of spokesmen and appointees of the other party on the grounds that those policies and recommendations are informed by value systems inimical to their own. In the US, this means that when spokesmen for one party endorse masks, members of the other party reject them instinctively and automatically.